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In this paper, we present numerical simulation results which explore the potential
global redistribution impacts of revenues raised by full global carbon pricing over several
decades as global growth continues. We assume a target of stabilizing emissions globally
such that temperature increase does not exceed 2∘C above preindsutrial level by 2105.
We assess the impacts on both absolute and relative global poverty of redistributing the
associated revenues in various ways. An obvious political impediment for such mech-
anisms is resolving whether full carbon pricing can only be administrated as a series
of separate national schemes with revenues remaining in countries, or whether a single
global revenue agency could realistically collect and redistribute revenues. While per-
haps Utopian, the possibility of such an agency creates a new opportunity for signiﬁcant
redistribution to the global poor.
Our simulations cover the period from 2015 to 2105, and assume stable energy demand
elasticities and energy eﬃciency improvement factors. Using an elasticity carbon pricing
method, we calculate implied revenues of roughly 6% of Gross World Product (GWP)
on average across the whole time period. Simulations suggest that continued higher
growth in lower wage large population economies, and especially China, will be a powerful
force driving global inequality reduction. But carbon pricing ﬁnanced redistribution can
also play a role in signiﬁcantly reducing both global inequality and absolute poverty.
If revenues are redistributed to countries on an equal per capita basis, the global Gini
coeﬃcient falls, on average, by an extra 4.9% over the period 2015 - 2105, and the bottom
decile share increases by a further 21.2%. Furthermore, if carbon pricing revenues are
used to directly fund transfers to the poor within countries, our simulations suggest
that using tax revenues in this way could also bring signiﬁcantly more individuals and
households globally above global poverty lines.
22 Background
Thus far in debate on global carbon emissions reduction the focus of any special ar-
rangements for poorer developing countries has been on the interpretation of the “com-
mon but diﬀerentiated responsibilities” commitment in favor of developing countries in
the 1994 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The
focus of this debate has been on smaller emissions reductions by lower income coun-
tries. The debate should also (and perhaps principally) include the use of carbon pricing
revenues to help the poor.
Global carbon pricing (eﬀectively a carbon tax) is clearly a superior policy option for
global redistributive purposes than carbon cap-and-trade systems, now in place in several
countries, and particularly in Europe. Cap-trade systems fall short of carbon pricing on
two grounds. One is that they collect small amounts of revenue and hence can only
fund small direct redistributive transfers. Moreover, they are basically within-country or
within-region mechanisms which have limited global redistributive eﬀects.
In what follows we explore how far full global carbon pricing can reduce relative
inequality and global absolute poverty globally.1 We assume growth trajectories for major
global economies and targets of emission stabilization, and assume rates of improvement
in emissions eﬃciency of energy use. We assume that growth in national economies
continues in the decades ahead, and that global carbon pricing which meets targets
for emissions reductions to stabilize global temperature is implemented. We then assume
that global carbon revenues from full global carbon pricing are used for poverty reduction
purposes rather than lowering other existing taxes.
3 Base Case and Counterfactual Scenarios
The time period covered by our simulations is 2015 through 2105. Our base case is
a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario without carbon emissions reductions for the global
economy between 2015 and 2105. This BAU scenario is similar to the base case of
1Other authors suggest using carbon pricing revenues for other purposes. One recent proposal is that
of Grubb and Droege (2010) who suggest using such revenues in Europe for debt reduction.
3Nordhaus’ RICE-2010 model (Nordhaus, 2010). Our counterfactual scenario implies an
emissions target aimed at controlling global temperature change to less than 2∘C by
2105. To be consistent with the BAU scenario, our counterfactual scenario also follows
Nordhaus’ RICE-2010 model (Nordhaus, 2010), using his “limit to 2∘C” case.
In our analysis of carbon pricing impacts we use a business as usual (BAU) or base
case given by projections out to 2105 developed by Nordhaus (2010). Three variables
are at the heart of our analysis: growth in country/regional incomes, country and global
emissions; and country and global population growth. Figure 1 sets out the paths of
these three variables at the global level for the period 1960 to 2008.
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Note: GWP is Gross World Product.
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP by country/region in the projections is given
by a modiﬁed neoclassical production function used by Nordhaus. Total output for
12 regions2 is projected by Nordhaus using a partial convergence model, and regional
outputs are then aggregated to a world total. We use Nordhaus’ adjusted projection
GDP which accounts for climate damages as our BAU scenario. Population projections
2Theses 12 regions are USA, EU, China, Russia, Japan, India, Africa, Latin America, Eurasia,
MidEast, Other Asia and Other High Income regions.
4used by Nordhaus involve a simpliﬁed logistic-type speciﬁcation in which the growth of
population by region in the ﬁrst decade is given and growth rates decline such that the
total global population approaches a limit of 8.5 billion3.
Emissions in these scenarios are projected using a series of geophysical equations
described in Nordhaus (2008). His emissions projections are developed using diﬀerent
methods and more recent data than the IPCC SRES scenarios (“Special Report on Emis-
sions Scenarios” for IPCC, 2000) 4.
The Nordhaus projections are for a 12-region classiﬁcation. Since our later calcula-
tions of poverty impacts of carbon pricing are at a country level, we need to decompose
the regionally aggregated data from Nordhaus. We assume that each country’s shares of
GDP, population and emissions within a region are constant at 2005 levels, the bench-
mark year in our analysis. Using this assumption, we decompose the regional aggregation
in these scenarios into country-level projections for 189 countries.
Table 1 summarizes predicted global trajectories of our three central variables from
2015 through 2105 in both the BAU scenario and the counterfactual scenario in which
global temperature increase is limited to 2∘C up to 2105.
3Nordhaus (2008) notes that this projection is slightly below the middle estimate of the United
Nations long-term projection (UN, 2004), but is calibrated to match the International Institute of Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) projections (IIASA, 2007).
4The Nordhaus emissions projections are toward the low end of the SRES range until the middle of
the twenty-ﬁrst century and then rise relative to some of the lower SRES scenario estimates.
5Table 1: BAU and Counterfactual Scenarios For GWP, Population and CO2 Emissions
Over 2015 - 2105 Implied by Nordhaus (2010)
2005 2015 2035 2055 2085 2105
BAU Scenario
GWP after damages before abatement, $trill 55.20 80.75 145.90 224.44 362.94 473.41
Population (millions) 6407.27 7169.69 8374.06 8897.53 8905.66 8888.67
Total carbon emissions (GTC per year) 9.57 11.51 14.08 15.87 17.83 19.19
Counterfactual Scenario
GWP (net of damages and abatement, $trill) 55.20 80.66 145.40 222.52 361.73 478.41
Population (millions) 6407.27 7169.69 8374.06 8897.53 8905.66 8888.67
Total carbon emissions (GTC per year) 9.57 8.73 7.56 3.38 0.27 0.17
Note: i) GWP is Gross World Product.
ii) In the counterfactual scenario, global temperature increase is limited to 2∘C or less up to 2105.
iii) $trill refers to trillion 2005 PPP dollars.
iv) GTC refers to gig metric tonnes of carbon.
4 Revenues From Carbon Pricing in Counterfactual
Analysis
We use counterfactual analyses around the scenarios set out above to evaluate the
potential redistributive impacts of alternative full global carbon pricing schemes aimed
at internalizing the global externality from carbon emissions. A single global price for all
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, to be administrated by a single
global agency collecting the revenues, that is eﬀectively a global carbon tax, is assumed.
Revenues are assumed to be deployed for alternative global redistributive purposes by
this global agency.
We assume that global carbon prices are set so as to achieve various target levels
of emissions. We assume growth rates for economies around the world, and a value for
the price elasticity of demand for fossil fuels. Given growth rates we then calculate the
carbon prices needed to achieve particular targets for annual emissions which in turn
maintain temperature change within key bounds.
A key element in our calculations of redistributive impacts is the level of carbon prices
6needed as these levels are critical in determining revenue. A variety of carbon pricing
assumptions are adopted in the literature as part of the global policy regime needed to
achieve various emissions targets (Stern, 2006; Nordhaus, 2008; Boyce and Riddle, 2009,
among others). These range from tens to thousands of dollars per tonne of carbon. Here,
we calculate the carbon pricing needed globally to achieve a bound on global temperature
change of 2∘C by 2105. This gives us carbon prices for our central cases. These vary
as we use diﬀerent estimates of the price elasticity of demand for fossil fuels since price
based instruments are used to achieve the global emissions reduction target.
The price elasticity of demand for energy is key in calculating our level of carbon
pricing, and we use literature based estimates of the elasticity of the demand for fossil
fuels in our calculations. Most of these estimates can be grouped into one of three
classes: near zero, near negative unity (minus one) or around minus one-half (Lipow,
2010). Komanoﬀ (2010) estimates separate demand price-elasticities by energy sources,
- 0.7 for electricity, - 0.4 for gasoline, - 0.6 for jet fuel, and - 0.5 for other fuels. US
shares of consumption across these energy categories are roughly 40%, 21%, 4% and 35%
(Komanoﬀ, 2010), and this yields an average elasticity across sources of - 0.55. We use
- 0.5 as our central global price elasticity of demand for fossil fuels. We assume this
elasticity is constant over time and over the interval of possible demands, (0,+∞). As a
result, each projection year assumes a constant own-price elasticity.
Another key element in our calculations of carbon pricing needed to achieve targets
for emissions reduction is the likely energy eﬃciency improvement over time either from
behavioral changes in energy consumption or technology upgrading. The International
Energy Agency (IEA) has issued three reports on worldwide energy eﬃciency. Accord-
ing to the latest (IEA, 2008), the energy eﬃciency improvement achieved for 16 IEA
countries5 over the period 1990 - 2005 averaged only 0.9%. We assume that this rate of
improvement remains constant after 2005.
Developing and transitional economics experienced larger energy eﬃciency improve-
5These are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. They comprise the greater part of the
OECD in terms of population and GDP.
7ments over the same period. For instance, in China, the index of Total Final Energy
Consumption per Unit of GDP fell from 100 in 1990 to 40 in 2005, averaging roughly
a 4% energy eﬃciency improvement per year. Similarly, India also saw high average
energy eﬃciency improvements of roughly 2.9% per year during the same period. Data
for other developing countries outside the IEA are limited. We assume a 3% energy eﬃ-
ciency improvement rate for the rest of the world except the 16 IEA countries included
above. These 16 IEA countries consumed around 50% of world primary energy in 2005
(UN, 2007, table in Box 1 on page 10). Combining these two groups yields an estimate
of 2% worldwide energy eﬃciency improvement per year. In our baseline analysis, we
assume this same energy eﬃciency improvement factor applies for both the BAU and the
counterfactual cases targeted to achieve a 2∘C temperature change cap. We then relax
this assumption in sensitivity analysis.
The third element is backstop technology progress including carbon absorption through
sinks, capture and storage; and innovation of other renewable non-carbon energy as sub-
stitution to fossil fuels when the carbon prices are high. This element is implicitly
expressed in Nordhaus’ (2008 and 2010) geophysical and industrial emissions equations.
It plays a crucial role in explaining how quite small emissions could sustain the world
economy toward the end of the simulation period, such as from 2085 to 2105. Here we
model this element explicitly, using a constant annual rate of emission reduction per unit
of energy,  , assumed equal to 4%.
Given the assumed values of    and  ∗
 , we solve for    and  ∗
  and then use a price
elasticity, eﬃciency improvement factors and technological progress in carbon capture, we
next calculate the carbon price levels and revenues needed to achieve emissions reductions
consistent with a global temperature change target of 2∘C. The base date is  0 and the
date for target temperature change is  . Emissions both at time  0 and   for the BAU
and counterfactual cases are as in Table 1. We denote BAU and counterfactual emissions
as    and  ∗
  respectively. Energy eﬃciency improves from   0 at time  0, to   0[  i( − 0)]
at time  , where   (  = 0,1) denotes the global eﬃciency improvement factor assumed
in both the BAU (  = 0) and counterfactual (  = 1) cases. In addition, the emissions
deﬂation factor due to backstop technology progress is  − ( − 0). We further assume a
8conversion from fossil fuels to carbon emissions coeﬃcient, denoted by  , which is ﬁxed
over time.
We thus have
   =    ⋅   0
￿
 
 0( − 0)￿
⋅  , (1)
 
∗
  =  
∗
  ⋅   0
￿
 
 1( − 0)￿
⋅   ⋅  
− ( − 0), (2)
where    and  ∗
  are fuels demands at   in BAU and counterfactual cases respectively.
After solving    and  ∗
 , we can then use a price elasticity of demand estimate to
calculate the carbon prices needed to achieve the given target.
We use an equivalent carbon tax (ECT) for carbon based fossil fuels energy sources,
since there is only an elasticity of demand of fuels, but no carbon demand elasticity as
such. We denote the incremental component of the price of fossil fuels (eﬀectively a tax)
due to full global carbon pricing as   , giving
 
∗
  = (1 +   )  , (3)
where   ∗
  and    are the prices of fuels at   for the counterfactual case (incorporating
carbon pricing) and the BAU case respectively. The elasticity of demand for fossil fuels
at time   is given by
( ∗
  −   )/  
(  ∗
  −   )/  
=   . (4)
As the eﬃciency improvement in the counterfactual case is the same as in our BAU
case (i.e.,  1 =  0), substituting (1) through (3) into (4) gives
   =
 ∗
   ( − 0) −   
    
. (5)
In later sensitivity analysis, we relax the similar country eﬃciency improvement factor




   −  ∗
   ( − 0) ⋅  −( 1− 0)( − 0)
   −  ∗
   ( − 0) ×   . (6)





   ( − 0) −   
  
   
, (7)
9where   
  is the incremental fossil fuels price from carbon pricing in the case using diﬀerent
country energy eﬃciency improvement factors.
Finally, the global full carbon price, Γ, measured as a PPP 2005 International $/metric
tonne of CO2 can be calculated by
Γ =   ×  , (8)
where   is the ﬁxed coeﬃcient relationship between gallons of fossil fuel and metric tonnes
of CO2; and   takes on the alternatives of    and   
  for uniform and country diﬀerent
energy eﬃciency improvement cases. Using an average price of gasoline over the last
10 years of $2/       (EIA, 2010), yields an estimated value of   (see also Komanoﬀ’s
(2010) CTC Carbon Tax Model).
Our method of determining levels of carbon pricing deviates from Nordhaus (2008
and 2010), even though our emissions data, in both BAU and counterfactual cases, are
the same. Nordhaus’ carbon pricing schemes yield carbon revenues less than 2% of Gross
World Product (GWP) on average. These imply a fossil fuels price elasticity of demand
that is seemingly very much larger than estimates in the empirical literature.
The elasticity method set out above yields a carbon price for global emissions each
period assuming all emissions are included and treated equally. Table 2 presents our
calculations carbon prices at diﬀerent dates. These imply that, over the next 100 years,
carbon prices would rise gradually from $85/TCO2 in 2015 to $1061/TCO2 by 2085, after
which they would decline to $819/TCO2 in 2105.
The revenues raised by the carbon pricing schemes are then assumed to be transferred
to lower income countries in various ways. Table 2 suggests that revenues from carbon
pricing in our central case are 4.5% of GWP in 2015 rising to a peak of 7.9% in 2055 and
declining then to 5.7% in 2105.
Figure 2 indicates that the revenues in absolute values increase over time from 2015 to
2105, despite the fact that the revenue share of GWP peaks at 7.90% in 2055. This is due
to two reasons. On one hand, the diﬀerence in carbon emissions between the BAU and
counterfactual scenarios is relatively stable from 2055 to 2105, which prevents revenues
over these years from growing sharply. On the other hand, GWP over the period between
10Table 2: Full Global Carbon Pricing and Associated Revenues
2015 2035 2055 2085 2105
Carbon Pricing 85 104 200 1061 819
Revenues 3.60 × 1012 9.01 × 1012 1.77 × 1013 2.55 × 1013 2.76 × 1013
Shares of GWP 4.5% 6.3% 7.9% 7.0% 5.7%
Carbon pricing, eﬀectively carbon tax rates are in $2005(PPP) per metric tonne of CO2. Revenues are in 2005 PPP
dollars. Shares refer to the ratio of revenues to the projected GWPs in respective years. 22 smaller countries are dropped
in our dis-aggregating regional projections of Nordhaus’ (2010) RICE-2010 model into country level data because of
missing data in the benchmark year of 2005.
2055 and 2105 continues to grow, while carbon emissions are curtailed to lower levels.
We thus see decreases in the share of carbon tax revenue in GWP from 2055 to 2105.





















Note: Revenues are carbon pricing revenues in absolute values.
Share is carbon pricing revenues as percentage of GWP.
5 Data Sources, Redistribution Schemes and Method-
ology for Counterfactual Analysis
5.1 Data Sources
For counterfactual analysis of the potential impacts of full global carbon pricing on
global poverty reduction, we need data on current emissions, population, global income
11distribution, and revenues from carbon pricing over 2005 to 2105, with an international
poverty line speciﬁed. Our benchmark year is 2005.
For the benchmark year, our GDP, carbon emissions and population data at country
level all draw on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The
WDI table has 211 countries in total. We only use 189 countries, dropping 22 due to
missing data in the benchmark year.
Beyond the benchmark year, projected GDP (in $2005PPP), carbon emissions and
population data at the 12 region level follow Nordhaus (2010). Under the assumption
that each country’s shares of GDP, emissions and population within its region are ﬁxed
at the levels of the benchmark year, we can generate country level data. The aggregate
data does not include the 22 countries that were dropped.
Using data on country emissions for each projection year, we allocate the tax burden
from carbon pricing reﬂected in the global revenues shown in Table 2 to each country
according to its share of global emissions. Ideally, to quantify redistributive impacts here,
we need data on global and within-country income distribution over the time period 2005
to 2105. While recent and comprehensive data on poverty and income distribution are
available from the World Bank, we do not know the pattern of emissions by income
within countries and have no basis for projecting future changes in national income
distributions other than those caused by our tax/transfer scheme. 6 However, the BAU
and counterfactual projections do provide a path for each country’s GDP per capita from
2005 to 2105. This provides a basis for projecting changes in income inequality between
countries, which is the most important component of global income inequality.
Despite the above diﬃculties, we can generate projections of both global income
inequality in the BAU and counterfactual scenarios. To project changes in inequality
between countries we use per capita GDP (in 2005 PPP dollars) as a proxy for per capita
personal income. This reﬂects the non-availability of personal income projections for
6The information we need on income distribution is available through the World Bank’s World De-
velopment Indicators. Information on poverty was obtained through PovcalNet, a product of the World
Bank’s Development Research Group. It is an interactive computational tool that estimates the extent
of absolute poverty in the world. It can be accessed freely via http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet.
122015 - 2105. Using GDP and population projections from Nordhaus (2010) taken to the
country level, we project the proxy income for each country. Within countries we ﬁt a
lognormal distribution for income in 2005 on the basis of World Bank data, as explained
below. For later years we assume that these within-country distributions only change
by scale, that is relative inequality of income measured before our tax/transfer schemes
remains the same as in 2005 within each country. To obtain projections of the global
income distribution after our tax/transfer schemes apply we assume that emissions are
proportional to income within countries. The ratio of emissions to income is, however,
allowed to vary across countries according to the Nordhaus projections along the BAU
and counterfactual paths.
5.2 Redistribution Schemes
We use two revenue redistribution schemes in our counterfactual analysis. The ﬁrst
redistributes equally on a per capita basis all over the world. This is the simplest ap-
proach. Our later calculations and analysis mainly focus on this alternative. Our second
scheme allocates a larger share of revenues on a global scale to the extreme poor than in
the equal per capita scheme. The extreme poor are those living below the World Bank’s
updated international poverty line which is discussed in section 5.3. Using this scheme,
we seek to ﬁnd whether it is possible to move all the extreme poor above the poverty
line by 2015 using only a carbon pricing and transfer scheme, and how large a share of
revenue needs to be dedicated to the extreme poor in order to realize this ambitious goal.
5.3 Methodology
We analyze the potential impacts of global carbon tax/transfer schemes in reducing
both relative inequality and absolute poverty on a global scale. For relative inequality,
we focus on changes in the global Gini coeﬃcient and the shares of the top and bottom
deciles. Since the Gini coeﬃcient tends to be relatively insensitive to changes in the tails
it is advisable to complement it with the top and bottom decile shares.
The Gini coeﬃcient can be decomposed into within country, between country, and
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where    is the Gini coeﬃcient within country  ,    is country  ’s proportion of global
population,    is its mean income relative to that of the whole world, and the remainder’
term   reﬂects the interaction eﬀect due to overlaps between the income distributions
in diﬀerent countries. We project future changes in global income distribution by mak-
ing separate projections for the three decomposition components. We use 2002 as our
calibration year. According to Milanovic (2009), this is the latest year having household
survey data and a reliable global Gini coeﬃcient estimate.
As explained above, we assume that relative inequality of income before the tax/transfer
scheme, and therefore the Gini coeﬃcient, stays ﬁxed over time within countries. The
WDI database provides Gini coeﬃcients for 143 of our 189 countries. Gini coeﬃcients
for the 46 countries with missing values are assumed equal to the arithmetic average.
This procedure gives us the ﬁrst term in equation 9 for income before the tax/transfer
scheme. The second term in equation 9 corresponds exactly to the “international” or
Concept 2 inequality of Milanovic (2005, 2009). That is, it is the global Gini coeﬃcient
one would obtain if there were zero inequality within countries. Finally, the value for
  can be calibrated using the Gini coeﬃcient for the global income distribution of 0.7
in 2002 found by Milanovic (2009) using 2005 PPP exchange rates. We further assume
that the value for   stays ﬁxed over the projection years. Equipped with values for the
“within” term and  , we are able to specify the global Gini coeﬃcients of income before
the carbon tax and transfer for each projection year.
To compute within-country Gini coeﬃcients for income after the carbon tax and
transfer we proceed as follows. We denote the average (proxy) income of country   as ¯   ,
the eﬀective carbon tax rate as a proportion of (proxy) income in country   as   , and the
per capita transfer as   . The Gini coeﬃcient of country   after tax and redistribution,
14 ′ , is 7
 
′  =  
  (1 −   )¯   
(1 −   )¯    +   
. (10)
Thus, we have a procedure for projecting global Gini coeﬃcients for income, both
before and after the carbon tax and transfer schemes we will model, along the BAU
and counterfactual Nordhaus paths from 2005 to 2105. But we would also like to know
the corresponding shares of the top and bottom deciles plus the absolute poverty levels
through time. In order to get this additional information we need complete world dis-
tributions of income for each run, year, and income measure. It would be possible to
build up the world distribution by aggregating individual estimates of the full income
distribution within each country. However, this is both laborious and would reﬂect false
precision since we cannot predict changes in the shape of the income distribution within
countries before the tax and transfer.
In quantifying top and bottom deciles and absolute-poverty impacts from carbon
pricing, we assume a lognormal distribution for global incomes. Denoting income as  ,
we thus assume it has the density function
 ( ) =
1
√
2   
 
−
(ln  −  )2
2 2 . (11)
Given a world population,  , the population  ℎ with income no higher than ℎ is
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To fully characterize this normalized function requires two parameters,   and  . In
our calculations, we generate a world population,  , and GWP,  , in scenario projections,
giving the world average income
 
 
for each year under study. In addition, we also have a
global Gini coeﬃcient for each time period. Using these data, we are able to parameterize
7The Gini coeﬃcient equals one half the ratio of the mean diﬀerence to the mean. The carbon tax
alone does not aﬀect this ratio, since it reduces the mean diﬀerence and the mean in equal proportion.
By itself the transfer, on the other hand, increases the mean and reduces the Gini coeﬃcient in inverse
proportion to the change in the mean, as we see in equation 10.
15the function (11) applying the following two formulas for lognormal distributions (see



















where Φ−1[⋅] is the inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.
In quantifying absolute poverty impacts, we next set the poverty line. We use a
criterion of $ 1.25 in 2005 PPP per day suggested by the World Bank as the international
poverty-line (Chen and Ravallion, 2008). This must be translated into an Equivalent
Poverty Line,   , in terms of GDP per capita. Chen and Ravallion (2008) document
that with the $1.25 poverty-line, 1.4 billion people were in poverty in 2005. As we have
world population  , and values of   and   for 2005, we can then solve for ln   mapping
into 1.4 billion in-poverty people using the inverse of equation 12. This critical value ln  
is equivalent to the $ 1.25 poverty-line. For simplicity we assume that the Equivalent
Poverty Line remains constant through time.
Equipped with distribution parameters and our Equivalent Poverty Line, we quantify
absolute poverty reduction due to carbon pricing and revenue redistribution. Firstly, in
our BAU scenario, we substitute values of   ,   and ln   for each year into equation
12 to ﬁnd the population in poverty without carbon pricing. Secondly, with carbon
pricing and revenues redistribution, we re-calculate GDP per capita for each country and
produce the new Gini and mean income accordingly. Then we repeat the ﬁrst step, and
substitute ln   and the new   and   into equation 12 to ﬁnd the population in poverty
in our counterfactual scenario. The diﬀerence in the populations in poverty in these two
scenarios (in-poverty population at ﬁrst step minus values from the second step) reﬂects
the impact of the carbon tax/transfer scheme in global absolute-poverty reduction.
166 The Global Redistributive Impacts of Carbon Pric-
ing
We next report results on the potential redistributive impacts of global revenue re-
deployment from full global carbon pricing. Our central carbon pricing scheme collects
revenues as speciﬁed in Table 2 which are the eﬀective carbon tax burdens allocated to
each country according to its shares of global emissions at various dates. These results
assume that the global price elasticity of demand for fossil fuels is −0.5, and the annual
energy eﬃciency improvement factors for both BAU and counterfactual cases are all 2%
per year for all countries. Moreover, GDP, population and emissions growth trajectories
follow Table 1.
6.1 Relative Inequality Reduction
We analyze global redistribution impacts in terms of global Gini coeﬃcients and in-
come shares of the top and the bottom deciles. Table 3 presents the results for relative
global inequality reduction for our central scheme. Trends for the three inequality indica-
tors are reported and show that global inequality would be reduced by continued growth
and development, particularly in China and India. The Gini coeﬃcient falls by around
25% in the BAU case over the projection period, from 0.6825 in 2015 to 0.5114 in 2105.
The bottom decile share increases by around 2.37 times and the top decile share decreases
by 31%. These results do not detract from growth in the developing economies being the
most powerful equalizing force which the most prominent changes in the bottom decile
share among the three indicators, but the incremental redistributive impact of carbon
pricing revenues remains.
The solid lines in Panel A to C of Figure 3 plot the changes in Gini coeﬃcient, bottom
decile share and top decile share across time periods. Columns with a “Carbon Pricing”
heading in Table 3 present the results for the three inequality indicators after carbon
pricing and transfer speciﬁed in our central scheme. In Figure 3, they are plotted in dot-
dash lines, with legends showing the elasticity of 0.5 used in brackets. Carbon pricing
17can play a major incremental role in global income equalization in addition to economic
growth, driving increases in the bottom decile shares and decreases in the Gini and top
decile shares. Among these three indicators, carbon pricing has the larger impacts on
the bottom decile share, and a slight downward shift in the top decile share.
Carbon pricing increases the bottom decile share by more than 15%. Across most
projection years, carbon pricing causes an additional decrease in the Gini coeﬃcient by
3% and, in the top decile share, by more than 4%.
Table 3: Relative Inequality Reduction by Carbon Pricing
Panel A: Gini Coeﬃcient Panel B: Bottom Decile Share Panel C: Top Decile Share
Year BAU Carbon Pring Change BAU Carbon Pricing Change BAU Carbon Pricing Change
2015 0.6825 0.6615 -3.1% 0.0035 0.0042 19.5% 0.5526 0.5288 -4.3%
2035 0.6309 0.6022 -4.6% 0.0054 0.0066 23.5% 0.4955 0.4658 -6.0%
2055 0.5876 0.5517 -6.1% 0.0073 0.0093 26.8% 0.4513 0.4171 -7.6%
2085 0.5368 0.5058 -5.8% 0.0102 0.0123 20.4% 0.4036 0.3765 -6.7%
2105 0.5114 0.4857 -5.0% 0.0119 0.0138 15.9% 0.3813 0.3597 -5.7%
Figure 3: Relative Inequality Reduction by Carbon Pricing


































































Figure 4 provides a picture of how global inequality and carbon emissions evolve
through the period under study. This ﬁgure plots the Lorenz curves of global income
and redistributed incomes after carbon pricing, together with that of carbon-emissions
per capita. We see that the body of the Lorenz curve of income shrinks continuously
over time, driven mainly by global economic growth. And in every year, the Lorenz
18curve of the redistributed income is enveloped by the curve for the before carbon pricing
case. This reiterates the impact of carbon pricing in equalizing global incomes further,
in addition to that from economic growth.
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Note: Lorenz curves of global incomes before and after redistributed are plotted in solid and dash lines
respectively. There is no carbon pricing and redistribution in 2005.
6.2 Absolute Poverty Reduction
Redistributing revenues from carbon pricing not only equalizes income globally, it
also provides promising possibilities to reduce or even remove global absolute poverty.
In quantifying the impacts of carbon pricing on global absolute poverty reduction, we
consider redistribution of revenues in two ways. The ﬁrst is to redistribute revenues
equally on a per capita basis globally. The second is to use a more pro-poor redistribution
scheme in which we redistribute a larger share of revenues to the poor. This second
19simulation helps us assess whether such a scheme can help erase all poverty by 2015, the
time line of the Millennium Development Goals (MGDs).
Figure 5 plots the density curves of global income in 2005 US$ PPP terms over time.
The vertical line in the ﬁgure represents the equivalent poverty line in terms of GDP per
capita, at $911 (2005 PPP) equivalent to the current Bank World poverty criterion of
$1.25 (2005 PPP) per day. The area under the curve and to the left of the vertical line
calculates the portion of people living in poverty. This times the corresponding world
population gives a projection of the number of people living in poverty.
Panel A shows that continued global economic growth will be the key force behind
poverty reduction in the next 100 years. The global income distribution moves system-
atically to the right, with poverty decreasing consistently. This process results in a large
reduction in global poverty. From Panel A of Figure 5 the poverty rate in 2105 is small
relative to 2005. In addition to the secular poverty reduction driven by growth, carbon
pricing contributes to this reduction further, as shown in Panel B of Figure 5, where we
use the year 2035 as an example.
The dashed line is the global density curve around the poverty line in the BAU case,
which is higher in the far left tail than the solid line describing the density curve of
redistributed global income after carbon taxes. This indicates the area under the solid
line and to the left of the poverty line is even smaller, as is the poverty rate. Such a
pattern also holds for other projection years which we omit for brevity. This suggests
carbon pricing has the potential to reduce poverty further in addition to the growth
eﬀect.
Using the method given in Section 5, we can also calculate numbers of people living in
poverty over time in BAU and carbon-pricing cases. Numbers in both cases and changes
in percentage for the BAU case are presented in Table 4. These results suggest that
economic growth in the BAU case can reduce poverty substantially over a century, if we
adhere to the $1.25 (2005PPP) per day criterion. There would be around one billion
people globally living in poverty in 2105 if the global economy continues growing as in
the BAU scenario. We thus see a very sharp decrease in the population in poverty across
time periods, both in BAU and carbon-tax cases, as plotted in Panel A of Figure 6.
20Figure 5: Density Curves Of Global Income Distribution
Panel A: Global Income Distribution Across Time  Panel B: Income Distribution Below The Poverty 
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Note: Panel A plots the density curves of global income across 2005, 2015, 2035, 2055, 2085 and 2105 in
the BAU case. Panel B plots the density curves of global income around the poverty line before (labeled
by density:2035) and after carbon pricing (labeled by density:2035redis) in 2035, in dash and solid lines
respectively. The pattern described by Panel B holds for other projection years.
Carbon pricing can also help attain Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). In the Millennium Declaration of 2000, 189 nations resolved to “halve extreme
poverty by 2015”. There are two variants for this target. One is in terms of the share
of people in extreme poverty as a percentage of national population, and the other is in
terms of the absolute extreme poverty population. Reducing the former is an easier task
due to the growth in world population, and several authors even argue we have already
attained such a goal (e.g. Bhalla, 2002; Sala-i-Martin, 2002). Our discussions centers on
the latter form of target, namely, “halve extreme poverty population by 2015”.
The estimated population under the international poverty line was 1.82 billion in
1990(See Table 5 of Chen and Ravallion, 2008). Thus, the primary target of Goal 1 of
the MDGs translates to around 0.92 billion people living under the international poverty
line by 2015 (UN, 2010). Our results in Table 4 indicate that this target can only be
met by around 88% (=
1.82 − 1.02
1.82 × 0.5
) by 2015 if there is no carbon pricing. However,





21Table 4: Numbers Of Population Living In Poverty And Changes
Year BAU Tax Change
2015 1,018,140,019 852,772,758 -16.24%
2035 383,141,322 257,904,611 -32.69%
2055 99,127,246 46,424,115 -53.17%
2085 7,235,425 2,451,849 -66.11%
2105 1,027,082 320,163 -68.83%
Note: These results are estimated by assuming Lognormal distribution for global income. The estimation
procedure is given in the Methodology section.
Figure 6: Population in Poverty and Its Diﬀerence Between Cases, 2015 - 2105







































































Going one step further, one may ask whether we could erase global poverty entirely
by 2015 if we use the carbon taxes revenues for global poverty reduction. Our results
suggest we only need around 33% of the revenues to achieve this goal. Figure 7 plots the
population remaining in poverty versus portions of carbon pricing revenues transferred
to the poor. In the case where carbon pricing revenues are redistributed on a per capita
basis, we transfer around 12% of the carbon pricing revenues to those under the interna-
tional poverty line. This helps achieve and even surpasses the goal of halving population
in poverty by 2015. If we use a mechanism which transfers more carbon pricing revenues
to the poor while keeping those just marginally above the poverty line from falling below,
22we see a steady decrease in the global population in poverty as shown in Figure 7. The
world could achieve the more ambitious goal of erasing global poverty by 2015 if such a
mechanism were used.
Figure 7: Poverty Population Changes With Portion of Carbon Pricing Revenues Trans-





















































6.3 Assessing the Anti-poor Nature of Carbon Pricing on the
Production Side
We can also use our analysis to evaluate the anti-poor properties of carbon pricing
from both the revenue and production sides. Since emissions intensity of production is
sharply higher in low income countries, they bear proportionally more of the tax burden
before revenues redistribution enters.
Figure 8 plots the country-level median carbon-emissions per capita and per dollar
GDP by income quintiles (in terms of GDP per capita) for the year 2035. The patterns in
Figure 8 remain constant until 2055. Panel A of Figure 8 shows that emissions per capita
increase with income. The richer a country is, the larger carbon-emission per capita it
has but emissions intensity of GDP falls. Median carbon emissions per capita in the ﬁfth
quintile countries are 3.43 Metric Tons (in carbon) in 2035, 6.06 times the median in the
ﬁrst quintile countries which is only 0.57. Carbon pricing is thus pro-poor in absolute
23terms on the production side but in proportion to income is pro-rich.
Panel B of Figure 8 shows that emissions per dollar of GDP are nonmonotonic in
GDP per capita. From the ﬁrst quintile to the third quintile, there is an increase with
income; but from the third quintile to the ﬁfth quintile a decrease. This reﬂects the
fact that rapidly growing developing countries like China and India located in the third
quintile emit heavily due to their growth. In contrast, the poorer countries in the left tail
have fewer factories and lower emissions per dollar of GDP. Meanwhile, richest countries
in the right tail have smaller emissions intensity due to high energy eﬃciency and a shift
away from heavily emitting manufacturing in recent decades.
Figure 8: Carbon Emissions (in Metric Tons Carbon) by GDP Per Capita Quintile (2035)
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We use Kakwani’s (1976) method to quantify the degree of propoorness of global
carbon pricing on the production side. Let  1[ ( )] and  1[ ( )] be proportion of
carbon pricing and redistributed revenues by the units having income less than or equal
to  .  ( ) is the distribution function of income  . The pairs  1[ ( )] vs.  ( ) and
 1[ ( )] vs.  ( ) form the concentration curves of taxes and redistribution respectively.
The concentration index is equal to one minus twice the area under the concentration
curve. We denote    and    as concentration indices of eﬀective carbon taxes and
revenues redistribution of our carbon pricing respectively. Following Kakwani (1976)
yields measures of propoorness from both the production side and revenues redistribution
24as follows:
   =    −  , (15)
   =    −  , (16)
where    and    denote propoorness indices of tax obligation and revenues redistribution
respectively,   is the Gini coeﬃcient of before-tax income. A positive propoorness index
indicates the tax scheme is pro-poor.
Summing equations 15 and 16 gives an overall propoorness index   as
  =    +    − 2 . (17)
Table 5 reports results of   ,    and   for respective projection years, with Figure
9 plotting their trajectories. It shows that our central carbon pricing scheme displays a
strongly pro-poor property in absolute terms as values of   are all very much larger than
zero. The redistribution eﬀect suggested by positive values of    together with negative
   before 2055 indicates the mixed progressiveness and regressiveness for the eﬀective
carbon tax obligations.
Table 5: Propoorness Measurements of Our Central Carbon Pricing
Year  T  R  
2015 -0.1839 0.5005 0.3166
2035 -0.0954 0.5807 0.4853
2055 -0.0135 0.6226 0.6091
2085 0.0649 0.7044 0.7693
2105 0.1020 0.7166 0.8185
6.4 Carbon-Pricing Schemes with Elasticity and Energy Im-
provement Sensitivity
As sensitivity analysis on our results, we consider variants around the central car-
bon pricing scheme by varying the elasticity and eﬃciency factors respectively across
plausible values.













In our central case, we use a demand elasticity for fossil fuels of −0.5. Our variants
suppose it changes to −0.6 and −0.7 respectively. Figure 10 depicts how these variations
impact global relative inequality reductions (the elasticity value is in the brackets in the
legends). The relative inequality reduction of carbon pricing is a decreasing function of
the elasticity, any of the Gini coeﬃcients or changes in top and bottom decile shares.
The bottom decile share is the most sensitive to the changes in elasticity.
Figure 10: Elasticity Sensitivity Analysis on Relative Inequality Reduction







































































Figure 11 plots the impacts on global absolute poverty reduction from elasticity-
variation. Absolute poverty reductions from carbon pricing diminish substantially due
to reduced tax revenues collected with a lower tax rate when the elasticity increases. With
an elasticity of −0.7, which collects the least carbon tax revenue among our variants, we
26still see the primary MDG goal, Goal 1, could be attained by 2015. In this case, the
global population in poverty is projected to be 0.89 billion by 2015, which also surpasses
the stated goal in the MDGs.































We also conduct sensitivity analysis for the eﬃciency improvement factors used the
BAU and counterfactual cases. We relax this assumption and suppose that the eﬃciency
improving factor in the counterfactual case changes to 3% and 4% respectively, while
keeping 2% in the BAU case. We see a similar pattern as in the elasticity sensitivity
analysis. Revenues decrease with further eﬃciency improvment in the counterfactual
case. As a result, revenue collected is reduced as are the redistributive eﬀects.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we quantify the potential impacts of full global carbon pricing on global
inequality and the implications for global poverty reduction. We use the projections from
Nordhaus’s (2010) RICE model to set up counterfactual scenarios incorporating a target
to limit global temperature increases to less than 2∘C over a 100 year time frame. We
assume a time-stable price elasticity of demand for fossil fuels of −0.5 and identical energy
27eﬃciency improvement factors across countries in counterfactual scenarios. Fully global
carbon pricing yields revenues of 6% of world gross product over our projection years. The
redistributive scheme generates major incremental global poverty reductions in addition
to those produced by economic growth. In terms of global relative equalization, this
scheme produces extra decreases in the global Gini index and the top decile share no
less than 4% and 2% respectively, and a more pronounced increase in the bottom decile
share of no less than 15%. Furthermore, using a more pro-poor redistribution scheme
which allocates a larger share of revenues to the extreme poor, we ﬁnd that poverty can
be erased by the MDG deadline year of 2015 at a cost of only 33% of carbon pricing
revenues.
References
[1] Bhalla, S.S., 2002. Imagine There is No Country: poverty, inequality, and growth in the era of
globalization, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.
[2] Boyce, J.K., Riddle, M.E., 2009. Cap and Dividend: a State-by-State Analysis. Working Paper,
Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
[3] Chen, S., Ravallion, M., 2008. The Developing World Is Poorer Than We Thought, But No Less
Successful In Fighting Against Poverty. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4703.
[4] Cowell, F.A., 1977. Measuring Inequality. Oxford: Phillip Allan Publishers.
[5] Deaton, A., 2008. How to Monitor Poverty for the Millennium Development Goals. Journal of
Human Development 4: 353 - 378.
[6] EIA, 2010. http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil gas/petroleum/analysis publications/primer on gasoline prices/html
/petbro.html.
[7] Grubb, M. and S. Droege, 2010. A Carbon Giveaway Europe Cannot Aﬀord. Financial Times, June
14. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cfdb84f2-77e8-11df-82c3-00144feabdc0.html.
[8] IEA, 2008. Worldwide Trends in Energy Use and Eﬃciency : Key Insights from IEA Indicator
Analysis. Paris: International Energy Agency.
[9] IIASA (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis) World Population Program. 2007.
Probabilistic Projections by 13 World Regions, Forecast Period 2000-2100, 2001 Revision. Available
online at http:// www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/proj01/.
[10] IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2000. Special Report on Emissions Scenarios.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
28[11] IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2007. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.
IPCC Plenary XXVII, Valencia.
[12] Kakwani, N.C., 1976. Measurement of Tax Progressivity: An International Comparison. The Eco-
nomic Journal 87: 71-80.
[13] Kemp-Bendict, E., 2001. Income Distribution and Poverty: Methods for Using Available Data in
Global Analysis. PoleStar Technical Notes No.4.
[14] Komanoﬀ, C., 2010. Carbon Tax Center (CTC) CARBON TAX 4 Sector Model,
www.carbontax.org.
[15] Lipow, G.W., Energy Price Demand Elasticity. www.carbontax.org.
[16] Milanovic, B., 2005. Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
[17] Milanovic, B., 2009. Global inequality recalculated: The eﬀect of new 2005 PPP estimates on global
inequality. MPRA Paper No. 16538.
[18] Nordhaus, W., 2008, A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming Policies.
New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
[19] Nordhaus, W., 2010, Papers and Files for RICE-2010 Model (May 2010),
http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/.
[20] Sala-i-Martin, X., 2002. The disturbing “rise” of global income inequality, NBER Working Paper
No. 8904, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
[21] Shorrocks, A., and D. Mookherjee, 1982. A Decomposition Analysis of the Trend in UK Income
Inequality. The Economic Journal 92: 886-902.
[22] Stern, N., 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
[23] UN (United Nations), 2007. Expert Group on Energy Eﬃciency, 2007: Realizing the Potential of
Energy Eﬃciency: Targets, Policies, and Measures for G8 Countries. Washington: United Nations
Foundation.
[24] UN (United Nations), Millennium Development Goals. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.
[25] UN (United Nations) United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Aﬀairs, Population
Division. 2004. World Population to 2300. ST/ESA/SER.A/236. New York: United Nations.
29